

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND OTHER FACTORS ON FIRM VALUE

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Abstract: *The purpose of this research was to obtain empirical evidence about the effect of the board of directors, board of commissioner, commissioner independent, institutional ownership, managerial ownership, public ownership, family ownership, firm size, and profitability as independent variables to firm value as a dependent variable. The population in this research using non-financial companies that were listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) from 2019-2021. The sample used for this research consists of 73 listed non-financial companies. The selection of this sample used the purposive sampling method with a total of 217 research data and the data analysis method in this research used multiple regression analysis. The result of this research indicated that the board of director, independent commissioner, and profitability have a positive effect on firm value. The board of commissioner and firm size have a negative effect on firm value while institutional ownership, managerial ownership, public ownership, and family ownership have not affected firm value.*

Keywords: *Corporate Governance, Firm Size, Firm Value, Profitability.*

Abstrak: Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk memperoleh bukti empiris mengenai pengaruh dari dewan direksi, dewan komisaris, komisaris independen, kepemilikan institusional, kepemilikan manajerial, kepemilikan publik, kepemilikan keluarga, ukuran perusahaan, dan profitabilitas sebagai variabel independen terhadap nilai perusahaan sebagai variabel dependen. Populasi yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah perusahaan non keuangan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI) selama tahun 2019-2021. Sampel yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini sebanyak 73 perusahaan non keuangan. Metode pengambilan sampel yang digunakan adalah purposive sampling dengan total 217 data dan untuk menganalisis data menggunakan analisis regresi berganda. Hasil dari penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa variabel dewan direksi, komisaris independen, dan profitabilitas berpengaruh positif terhadap nilai perusahaan. Dewan komisaris dan ukuran perusahaan berpengaruh negatif terhadap nilai perusahaan sedangkan kepemilikan institusional, kepemilikan manajerial, kepemilikan publik dan kepemilikan keluarga tidak berpengaruh terhadap nilai perusahaan.

Kata Kunci: Tata Kelola Perusahaan, Ukuran Perusahaan, Nilai Perusahaan, Profitabilitas.

INTRODUCTION

In the current situation, more and more problems arise from various sectors, including the economic sector. Companies are increasingly demanding to be able to provide more value to their companies in order to compete and attract capital from outside. This causes investors to be able to understand the situation within the company before investing, one of which is understanding the company's value which is used as a selling price for potential investors (Husna & Satria, 2019). One of the supporting factors for corporate value is good corporate governance in terms of board structure, ownership structure, profitability, and company size.

In Indonesia, several companies have problems related to corporate governance that affect firm value. One of them is the case of weak implementation of corporate governance, PT. Indonesian Railways (PT. KAI). Since 2004 PT KAI has conducted audits by BPK and Public Accountants but in 2005, PT. KAI has manipulated financial reports involving public accountants, and the manipulated results cause a loss which is turned into a profit. This was only discovered when there were differences of opinion between management and the commissioners. The commissioners refused to approve and sign the financial statements the external auditors had audited. PT. KAI suspects there was a form of manipulation in its financial reports by obtaining a significant profit of IDR 6.9 billion. When examined and examined in more detail, it suffered a loss of IDR 63 billion (Onasis & Robin, 2016). Based on the case description, it can be concluded that the lack of supervisory control and the implementation of good corporate governance can lead to fraud which results in a decrease in the level of trust of investors and the public in the company so that it can reduce the value of the company.

This study replicates previous research conducted by Ing Malelak et al. (2020) with the variables used by the board of directors, board of commissioners, independent commissioners,

managerial ownership, institutional ownership, public ownership, and family ownership. Differences in previous studies conducted by Ing Malelak et al. (2020) with current research in terms of the variables studied, where there are additional independent variables, namely company size, and profitability, based on the research of Husna and Satria (2019). Another difference from this study is the year, where previous research was conducted by Ing Malelak et al. (2020) researched in 2008-2018. At the same time, this research was examined in 2019-2021.

Agency Theory

Agent theory is a model of problem formulation that occurs due to conflicts between shareholders as company owners and managers as parties who carry out activities within the company (Sudiyatno & Puspitasari, 2016). An imbalance of information is held, and the agent can act more than the principal. As a result, the lower the information asymmetry between agents and principals, the higher the firm value. The higher the information asymmetry between agents and principals, the lower the firm value. As a result of the conflicts that occur, companies are required to be able to implement good corporate governance to minimize the information gap between agents and principals.

Signal Theory

The signal theory provides information about the company's condition to shareholders as a form of responsibility for managing the company (Lanawati & Amilin, 2015). Signal theory tells how companies give signals to users of their financial statements, and signals will be given in the form of information about the actions taken by the company to realize the wishes of shareholders (Kumiasari & Warastuti, 2015). The company avoids the existence of an information asymmetry with parties who provide information as a signal to investors so that they can provide welfare in the future.

Firm Value

Firm value is defined as market value because the benefits of market value can be used as a provider of maximum prosperity for shareholders. Company management can take this policy as a form of effort to increase firm value, namely through increasing the prosperity of owners and shareholders, which is reflected in a company's stock price ([Daves, 1989](#)).

Board of Directors and Firm Value

The board of directors has an important role in managing the company, from controlling rights in managing company resources to funds from investors ([Utomo & Dianawati, 2017](#)).

Research conducted by [Husaini and Saiful \(2017\)](#), [Onasis and Robin \(2016\)](#), and [Sondokan \(2019\)](#) states that the board of directors has a positive influence on firm value. This means that the more the number of directors in the company, the better effect will be created for implementing company management.

Research conducted by [Mary et al. \(2021\)](#) and [Ing Malelak et al. \(2020\)](#) stated that the board of directors' harms firm value. The size of the board of directors can increase the possibility of fraud occurring in financial reports and cause a lack of ability of the board of directors to carry out activities within the company ([Gill & Mathur, 2011](#)).

Research by [Thendean and Meita \(2010\)](#) and [Khoirunnisa and Aminah \(2022\)](#) states that the board of directors does not affect firm value. The board of directors' role in a company is only as a responsible party and has full authority in carrying out and directing resources according to company goals. This is driven by the composition of the board of directors, which dominates internal directors.

H₁: There is an influence of the board of directors on firm value.

Board of Commissioners and Firm Value

The board of commissioners is a supervisor who exercises various controls over

company management, so it has an important role in company activities ([Zulfikar et al., 2017](#)).

Research conducted by [Marini and Marina \(2017\)](#), [Astrini et al. \(2017\)](#), [Junitania and Prajitno \(2019\)](#), and [Sari and Sanjaya \(2018\)](#) state that the board of commissioners has a positive effect on firm value. Maximizing the board of commissioners in the company can increase transparent oversight, accountability, and fairness.

Research conducted by [Fintreswari and Sutiono \(2017\)](#) and [Kusumaningrum and Nugroho \(2019\)](#) states that the board of commissioner's harms firm value. The more the board of commissioners can cause many opinions making it difficult to coordinate and communicate between members.

Research conducted by [Ing Malelak et al. \(2020\)](#), [Angeline and Tjahjono \(2020\)](#), and [Felicia and Karmudiandri \(2019\)](#) state that the board of commissioners does not affect firm value. These results indicate that because the function of the board of commissioners in a company is only as a controller and is not directly involved in the company's operations, it is considered to have little influence on firm value.

H₂: There is an influence of the board of commissioners on firm value.

Independent Commissioners and Firm Value

Independent Commissioner is a board that must supervise the company's activities. Independent commissioners are considered the highest form of control mechanism in a company responsible for monitoring top management, which impacts increasing firm value ([Jensen and Meckling 1976](#)).

Research conducted by [Ing Malelak et al. \(2020\)](#), [Husaini and Saiful \(2017\)](#), [Angeline and Tjahjono \(2020\)](#), and [Wicaksana and Wirjawan \(2019\)](#) states that independent commissioners have a positive effect on firm value. This shows that an independent commissioner is expected to be able to assist in supervising the actions of company directors so

that they can act in the interests of the principal in the long term.

Research conducted by [Wedayanthi and Darmayanti \(2016\)](#) and [Fadillah \(2017\)](#) states that independent commissioners harm firm value. This influence is due to the existence of an independent commissioner only to fulfil government regulations, which are not intended to enforce corporate governance.

Research by [Amaliyah and Herwiyanti \(2019\)](#) and [Fauzia and Djashan \(2019\)](#) states that independent commissioners do not affect firm value. These results indicate that the role of independent commissioners could be more effective for companies because the existence of independent commissioners is only a formality to comply with regulations and financial services authorities.

H₃: There is an independent commissioner's influence on firm value.

Institutional Ownership and Firm Value

Institutional ownership can impact firm value because the function of institutional ownership is the party that oversees the company ([Amaliyah & Herwiyanti, 2019](#)). The size of institutional ownership in a company can provide an optimal boost to firm value through management performance ([Amrizal & Rohmah, 2017](#)).

Research conducted by [Ing Malelak et al. \(2020\)](#), [Putra \(2016\)](#), [Wati et al. \(2021\)](#), and [Kusumaningtyas \(2015\)](#) stated that institutional ownership has a positive effect on firm value. The higher the proportion of shares owned, the better the monitoring effort will increase.

Research conducted by [Patrisia et al. \(2019\)](#) and [Junitania and Prajitno \(2019\)](#) state that institutional ownership harms firm value. These results indicate that the greater the level of institutional share ownership, the greater the oversight to deter opportunistic managers, but due to high oversight within the company can lead to high costs, thereby reducing the company's value.

Research conducted by [Amaliyah and Herwiyanti \(2019\)](#), [Purba and Africa \(2019\)](#), [Felicia and Karmudiandri \(2019\)](#), and [Sari and Sanjaya \(2018\)](#) states that institutional ownership does not affect firm value. These results indicate that there is more and more institutional ownership, making monitoring of company management less effective. Making corporate control lower and institutional investors with majority share ownership will tend to side with management to prioritize personal interests.

H₄: There is an influence of institutional ownership on firm value.

Managerial Ownership and Firm Value

According to agency theory, agency conflicts are caused by conflicting interests between principals and agents ([Dewi & Nugrahanti, 2017](#)). Managerial ownership within the company can reduce the differences between management and shareholders. If this happens, the company's condition can be said to be promising good profits and raises the interest of investors to invest their funds ([Jensen & Meckling, 1976](#)).

Research conducted by [Artini and Puspaningsih \(2011\)](#) and [Agustina \(2017\)](#) states that managerial ownership positively affects firm value. This shows that the greater the proportion of ownership by management, the better and more active it is in working for the benefit of shareholders.

Research conducted by [Husaini and Saiful \(2017\)](#), [Suryaningsih et al. \(2018\)](#), and [Suastini et al. \(2016\)](#) stated that managerial ownership harms firm value. These results contradict agency theory which states that one solution to agency conflict is to increase managerial ownership. If managerial ownership increases but does not increase firm value, investors do not respond to any information as a positive signal. Shareholders feel worried, so they try to monitor and influence management decision-making ([Suastini et al., 2016](#)).

Research conducted by [Ing Malelak et al. \(2020\)](#), [Putra \(2016\)](#), [Sembiring and Trisnawati \(2019\)](#), [Sari and Sanjaya \(2018\)](#), [Felicia and Karmudiandri \(2019\)](#), [Junitania and Prajitno \(2019\)](#), [Wicaksana and Wirjawan \(2019\)](#), [Purba and Africa \(2019\)](#), [Onasis and Robin \(2016\)](#) stated that managerial ownership does not affect firm value. These results indicate that if managerial ownership is considered less significant, the benefits for managers are small, so it will not affect managerial performance and motivation to increase firm value.

H₅: There is an effect of managerial ownership on firm value.

Public Ownership and Corporate Value

Public ownership is shared ownership in a company owned by the public or other outsiders ([Vitalia & Widyawati, 2016](#)). High public disclosure will increase public and investor confidence in the company. Another function of the public is useful for overseeing all activities carried out by management so that the company can run according to the expected goals ([Matondang & Yustrianthe, 2017](#)).

Research conducted by [Ing Malelak et al. \(2020\)](#) and [Julekhah and Rahmawati \(2019\)](#) state that public ownership has a positive effect even though the percentage owned is small in the company but can have a good effect on increasing firm value, meaning that the company has the trust of the public.

Research conducted by [Firdausi et al. \(2022\)](#), [Sairin \(2018\)](#), and [Hasnawati and Sawir \(2015\)](#) state that public ownership harms firm value. Public shareholders are usually investors who expect short-term profits, so they ignore things that are material for the development of a company.

Research conducted by [Adnantara \(2013\)](#) states that public ownership does not affect firm value because the percentage of ownership is less than 5%, making it impossible to monitor and intervene in the performance of existing management.

H₆: There is an influence of public ownership on firm value.

Family Ownership and Firm Value

Family ownership is a group of people with blood relations or kinship in the company which has been passed down from generation to generation ([Pratiwi and Aligarh 2021](#)).

Research conducted by [Safitri et al. \(2018\)](#), [Pitri \(2021\)](#), and [Rakhmini Juwita \(2017\)](#) states that family ownership has a positive effect on firm value. This shows that the higher the proportion of family share ownership, the firm value will increase.

[Patrisia et al. \(2019\)](#) found that family ownership harms firm value. If there are family members in the company, it is feared that a conflict will arise, eventually leading to tolerance for less competent people for reasons of kinship.

Research conducted by [Hartanto \(2014\)](#) and [Wati et al. \(2021\)](#) stated that family ownership does not affect firm value. This result is because family companies have uniqueness, strengths, and weaknesses in running their business, so investors need to consider whether a company is a family company or not in making investment decisions.

H₇: There is an influence of family ownership on firm value.

Company Size and Firm Value

Company size is a measure that can be calculated from total assets, sales or company capital ([Mutmainah, 2015](#)). If the company's size is large, it shows that it is experiencing good and healthy growth. Large company sizes can easily enter the capital market because an investor feels he is receiving a good signal from the company ([Prasetyorini, 2013](#)).

Research conducted by [Rudangga and Sudiarta \(2021\)](#), [Husna and Satria \(2019\)](#), [Prasetyorini \(2013\)](#), and [Sembiring and Trisnawati \(2019\)](#) states that company size has a positive effect on firm value. A good firm value shows a good level of company financial health

and will increase the firm value and attract investors.

Research conducted by [Prastuti and Sudiartha \(2016\)](#), [Lusiana and Agustina \(2017\)](#), and [Onasis and Robin \(2016\)](#) states that company size harms firm value. Companies with many assets cannot utilize their assets effectively, causing asset hoarding because the turnover of company assets will be longer. The decline in firm value is affected by ineffective performance, so investors will reconsider investing their capital.

Research conducted by [Angeline and Tjahjono \(2020\)](#), [Afifah and Susanty \(2019\)](#), [Felicia and Karmudiandri \(2019\)](#), and [Wicaksana and Wirjawan \(2019\)](#) states that company size does not affect firm value. This is because investors who buy company shares are seen not only by how big the company's assets are but also by other factors such as financial reports, good name, and dividend policy.

H₈: There is an effect of company size on firm value.

Company Profitability and Value

High profitability indicates a good company condition, so investors will respond positively, increasing firm value. This happened because the company managed to increase profits which showed that the company had a good performance that would affect stock prices on the market ([Husna & Satria, 2019](#)).

Research conducted by [Husna and Satria \(2019\)](#), [Chen and Chen \(2011\)](#), [Novari and Lestari \(2016\)](#), [Onasis and Robin \(2016\)](#), [Angeline and Tjahjono \(2020\)](#), [Purba and Africa](#)

[\(2019\)](#), [Wicaksana and Wirjawan \(2019\)](#), [Felicia and Karmudiandri \(2019\)](#) state that profitability has a positive effect on firm value. High profits indicate good company prospects, thereby increasing demand for shares and causing the company's value to increase.

Research conducted by Herawati (2013) and Mercyana et al. (2022) stated that profitability harms firm value. If profitability increases, the value of the company will decrease. This is because an increase in profitability will increase earnings per share, but the share price does not increase, so the company's value decreases.

Oktrima (2017) research states that profitability does not affect firm value. This result is due to management's performance needing to be able to utilize the company's assets properly, causing net income to be small and assets owned to be large.

H₉: There is an effect of profitability on firm value.

RESEARCH MODEL

The form of research used is causality research. Causality research determines the causal relationship contained in the variables used in research. The research objects used are non-financial companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2019 to 2021. Seventy-three companies can be used in this study. Out of the total data used, there are 219. The sampling method is purposive sampling method using the following seven criteria:




Figure 1 Research Model

Table 1. Sample Selection Procedure

Sample Criteria	Number of Companies	Total of Data
Non-financial companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange consistently during the 2019-2021 period	505	1.515
Non-financial companies that do not present financial statements ending December 31 for the period 2019-2021	(28)	(84)
Non-financial companies that do not issue financial statements using Rupiah consistently during 2019-2021	(82)	(246)
Non-financial companies that did not consistently earn net profit during the 2019-2021 period	(211)	(633)
Non-financial companies that did not consistently report managerial ownership during the period 2019-2021	(94)	(282)
Non-financial companies that did not consistently report institutional ownership during the period 2019-2021	(4)	(12)
Non-financial companies that did not consistently report family ownership during the period 2019-2021	(13)	(39)
Number of research samples that meet the criteria	73	219
The amount of data that does not pass the outlier test		(2)
The amount of data processed		217

Source: Research Criteria.

Firm Value

Firm value is the result of the company's achievement of the trust that has been given by the community after various activities during the current year ([Denziana & Monica, 2016](#)). The dependent variable used in this study is firm value using Tobin's Q measurement. This study uses a ratio scale which is formulated as follows ([Malelak et al., 2020](#)):

$$\text{Tobin's Q} = \frac{EMV + D}{EBV + D}$$

EMV = Equity Market Value
 = (Closing Price x Number of Shares Outstanding)
 D = Book Value of Debt
 EBV = Equity Book Value

Board of Directors

The board of directors has the function of being responsible for managing the implementation so that the right number of members of the board of directors is needed in a company ([Firdausya et al. 2013](#)). This study uses a ratio scale which is formulated as follows ([Malelak et al. 2020](#)):

BDir = Σ members of the board of directors

Board of Commissioners

The board of commissioners is a group of company members responsible for supervising activities within the company Sakti and Penta (2012) ([Angeline & Tjahjono, 2020](#)). The scale used is a ratio scale ([Malelak et al., 2020](#)):

BCom = Σ members of the board of commissioners

Independent Commissioner

Independent commissioners are a group of people who come from outside the company and have no affiliation with the company, as their job is to protect all the shareholders' interests ([O.P. Siahaan, 2012](#)). The ratio scale is used ([Malelak et al., 2020](#)):

ICom = Σ members of the independent commissioners

Institutional Ownership

Institutional ownership is a form of company ownership partly owned by institutions, for example, banks, insurance companies, securities companies, and other institutional ownership ([Kusumaningrum & Rahardjo, 2013](#)). The scale is a ratio scale ([Malelak et al., 2020](#)):

IOwn = % institutional ownership

Managerial Ownership

Managerial ownership is a proportion of companies whose ownership consists of directors, management, commissioners, or parties who have actively participated in decision-making in the company ([Sembiring & Trisnawati, 2019](#)). The scale is a ratio scale as follows ([Malelak et al., 2020](#)):

MOwn = % managerial ownership

Public Ownership

Public ownership is the number of shares whose owners are the company's public or general public. The higher this ownership, the greater the disclosure of information publicly in the form of the company's annual report ([Matondang & Yustrianthe, 2017](#)). The scale is a ratio scale as follows ([Malelak et al., 2020](#)):

POwn = % public ownership

Family Ownership

According to [Fardani and Mardani \(2017\)](#), family ownership is the proportion of ownership by individuals or private companies (above 5%), not state-owned companies or financial institutions. Family ownership is done by looking at the names of the board of directors and board of commissioners (affiliated). If another institution owns the company, ownership tracking is carried out using a pyramid ownership analysis ([Wiranata & Nugrahanti, 2013](#)). The scale is a ratio scale as follows ([Malelak et al., 2020](#)):

FOwn = % family ownership

Company Size

Company size is a company's total assets in a certain period (Winarto, 2015). The scale used is a ratio scale (Sembiring & Trisnawati, 2019):

SIZE = Ln (Total Assets)

Profitability

Profitability is the company's ability to earn profits through all capabilities and resources, such as sales activities, cash, capital, etc. Return on Assets is one of the profitability ratios used for economic profitability (Susilawati, 2012). Profitability can be seen based on Return on Assets by comparing net income and total assets. The ratio scale is used (Husna & Satria, 2019):

$$ROA = \frac{\text{Net Profit}}{\text{Total Assets}}$$

RESEARCH RESULT

Table 2. Descriptive Statistical Test Results

Variable	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
TOBINS'Q	217	0,3633092	16,2633288	1,6669506	1,8123599
BDIR	217	2	11	5,03	2,021
BCOM	217	2	16	3,88	2,054
ICOM	217	1	5	1,58	0,825
IOWN	217	0,0000640	0,9485000	0,5952559	0,2184436
MOWN	217	0,0000010	0,6459000	0,0945565	0,1451632
POWN	217	0,0023000	0,6467000	0,2608905	0,1418158
FOWN	217	0,0002000	0,8746000	0,3735573	0,3108122
SIZE	217	25,0488457	32,8203949	28,9227905	1,4690468
ROA	217	0,0004069	0,4070516	0,0709628	0,0677437

Source: Results of Data Processing

Table 3. t-Test Results

Variable	B	Sig	Result
(Constant)	8,742	0,000	-
BDIR	0,150	0,019	H ₁ accepted
BCOM	-0,336	0,000	H ₂ accepted
ICOM	1,329	0,000	H ₃ accepted
IOWN	0,073	0,919	H ₄ not accepted
MOWN	-0,319	0,756	H ₅ not accepted
POWN	-0,860	0,376	H ₆ not accepted
FOWN	-0,394	0,225	H ₇ not accepted
SIZE	-0,321	0,000	H ₈ accepted
ROA	14,393	0,000	H ₉ accepted

Source: Results of Data Processing

The results of the t-test in Table 3 of the board of directors' variable (BDIR) show that the sig. of 0,019 and smaller than the alpha value (0,05) with a coefficient of 0,150, indicating that H_1 is acceptable. It can be concluded that the board of directors' variable (BDIR) positively affects firm value (TOBIN'S Q). The results of this study are consistent with research conducted by [Husaini and Saiful \(2017\)](#), [Onasis and Robin \(2016\)](#), and [Sondokan \(2019\)](#), that the more the number of directors in the company, the better effect will be created in the implementation of company management.

The Board of Commissioners variable (BCOM) shows that the sig. Equal to 0,000 and smaller than the alpha value (0,05) with a coefficient value of -0,336, indicating that H_2 is acceptable, it can be concluded that the board of commissioner's variable (BCOM) harms the firm value. The results of this study are consistent with research conducted by [Kusumaningrum and Nugroho \(2019\)](#) and [Fintreswari and Sutiono \(2017\)](#) that the more commissioners, the more opinions will make it difficult to coordinate and will have difficulty communicating between members.

The independent commissioner variable (ICOM) shows that the sig. of 0,000 and smaller than the alpha value (0,05) with a coefficient value of 1,329, indicating that H_3 is acceptable. It can be concluded that the independent commissioner variable (ICOM) influences firm value. The results of this study are consistent with research conducted by [Ing Malelak et al. \(2020\)](#), [Husaini and Saiful \(2017\)](#), [Angeline and Tjahjono \(2020\)](#), [Wicaksana and Wirjawan \(2019\)](#), that the more the number of independent commissioners, the more able to control top management and can perform monitoring functions more effectively which has an impact on increasing the value of the company.

The institutional ownership variable (IOWN) shows a sig. of 0,919 and is greater than the alpha value (0,05) with a coefficient value of 0,073, indicating that H_4 is unacceptable. It can

be concluded that the variable institutional ownership (IOWN) does not affect firm value. The results of this study are consistent with research conducted by [Amaliyah and Herwijanti \(2019\)](#), [Adnantara \(2013\)](#), [Sembiring and Trisnawati \(2019\)](#), [Purba and Africa \(2019\)](#), [Felicia and Karmudiandri \(2019\)](#), [Sari and Sanjaya \(2018\)](#), that the greater the level of institutional share ownership, the greater the supervision carried out to deter opportunistic managers, but as a result of high supervision within the company it can lead to high costs thereby reducing the value of the company.

The managerial ownership variable (MOWN) shows that the value of sig. of 0,756 and greater than the alpha value (0,05) with a coefficient value of -0,319, indicating that H_5 is unacceptable. It can be concluded that the managerial ownership variable (MOWN) does not affect firm value. The results of this study are consistent with research conducted by [Husaini and Saiful \(2017\)](#), [Suryaningsih et al. \(2018\)](#), and [Suastini et al. \(2016\)](#), if managerial ownership increases but does not increase firm value, investors will not respond to any information as a positive signal. Shareholders feel worried, so they try to monitor and influence management decision-making.

The public ownership variable (POWN) indicates that the sig. of 0,376 and greater than the alpha value (0,05) with a coefficient value of -0,860, indicating that H_6 is unacceptable. It can be concluded that the public ownership variable (POWN) does not affect firm value. The results of this study are consistent with research conducted by [Firdausi et al. \(2022\)](#), [Sairin \(2018\)](#), and [Hasnawati and Sawir \(2015\)](#), that public ownership harms firm value. Public shareholders are usually investors who expect short-term profits, so they ignore things that are material for the development of a company.

Family ownership variable (FOWN) has sig. Of 0,225 and greater than the alpha value (0,05) with a coefficient value of -0,394, indicating that H_7 is unacceptable, it can be concluded that the family ownership variable

(FOWN) does not affect firm value. The results of this study are consistent with research conducted by [Hartanto \(2014\)](#) and [Wati et al. \(2021\)](#), that family ownership, as measured by the percentage of share ownership that is large or small each year, does not affect firm value because family companies have uniqueness and advantages in running their business, but investors do not consider this in making their investment decisions.

The company size variable (SIZE) shows a sig. of 0,000 and is smaller than the alpha value (0,05) with a coefficient value of -0,321, indicating that H_8 is acceptable. It can be concluded that the firm size variable (SIZE) harms firm value. The results of this study are consistent with research conducted by [Prastuti and Sudiarta \(2016\)](#) and [Lusiana and Agustina \(2017\)](#). [Onasis and Robin \(2016\)](#), because companies with many assets have not been able to utilize their assets effectively, causing asset hoarding, this can cause a decrease in firm value due to ineffective performance and make investors think again about investing their capital.

The profitability variable (ROA) shows a sig. of 0,000 and is greater than the alpha value (0,05) with a coefficient value of 14,393, indicating that H_9 is acceptable. It can be concluded that the profitability variable (ROA) positively affects firm value (TOBIN'S Q). The results of this study are consistent with research conducted by [Husna and Satria \(2019\)](#), [Chen and Chen \(2011\)](#), [Novari and Lestari \(2016\)](#), [Onasis and Robin \(2016\)](#), [Angeline and Tjahjono \(2020\)](#), [Wicaksana and Wirjawan \(2019\)](#), [Felicia](#)

[and Karmudiandri \(2019\)](#), that the existence of high profits can indicate good company prospects so that it can also increase demand for shares and cause firm value to increase.

CONCLUSION

From the research conducted, the board of directors, independent commissioners, and profitability positively affect firm value. The board of commissioners and company size harm firm value, and other variables such as institutional, managerial, public, and family ownership do not affect firm value.

This research has several limitations, as follows:

1. The results of the data normality test are only normally distributed after the outlier test is performed.
2. Several research variables do not meet one of the classic assumption tests, namely the heteroscedasticity test, namely the independent commissioner variables, family ownership, company size, and profitability.

Based on the existing limitations, researchers can provide recommendations or input as follows:

1. Adding the research period using a longer period so that more samples and data are used, so that they can describe the actual condition of the company and hope that the existing data can be normally distributed.
2. Transform the data to fulfil all classical assumption tests, such as the heteroscedasticity test.

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